This viewpoint clearly influenced the architects of the recently enacted Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA). The new law's stringent corporate minimum tax of 20 percent, coupled with significant reductions in capital recovery allowances, will raise corporate taxes by $120 billion during the next five years.
This· paper examines why corporate taxes have declined. It decomposes movements in federal tax receipts into components attributable to changes in tax rates, changes in tax preferences, changes in corporate profitability, and other factors. The results suggest that although legislative changes have been important contributors to the decline of corporate tax revenues, they account for less than half of the change since the rnid-1960s. Reduced profitability, which has shrunk the corporate tax base, is the single most important cause of declining corporate taxes.
The paper is divided into five sections. Section 1 documents the decline in corporate tax revenues during the last three decades. Section 2 presents a simple division of changes in corporate taxes into components due to changes in tax rules and changes in the corporate tax base. It shows that during the last twenty years, though the average tax rate has fallen by nearly one third, corporate profitability has declined by a factor of two. Section 3 examines the factors that have been most important in reducing average corporate tax rates. It focuses on changes in capital recovery, inflation-induced misstatement of corporate profits, and various legislative changes. The fourth section examines the expected revenue gains under the TRA and presents preliminary evidence on how the bill will alter average tax rates. There is a brief conclusion.
The Withering Corporate Income Tax
The decline in corporate taxes played an important part in stimulating recent calls for tax reform. The withering of the corporate income tax, however, began long before the passage of the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) in 1981. Corporate tax payments as a share of GNP or the value of corporate assets have been declining for nearly three decades. This trend accelerated during the last five years, when real corporate taxes also declined. Table 1 presents four measures of the net corporate tax payments by nonfinancial corporations. We measure tax payments net of refunds obtained by carrying current losses back to offset prior taxes, including taxes collected as a result of audits or other retabulations. A detailed description of our data series is provided in the appendix. We focus on nonfinancial corporations (NFCs) because they were most significantly affected by the changes in capital recovery rules under ERTA. The NFCs accounted for 89 percent of corporate tax revenues in 1984 and 1985 , and movements in their tax payments track total taxes very closely. There are also detailed tax provisions affecting financial firms (see Neubig and Steuerle (1983) ) that we avoid by focusing on the NFCs.
The first column of Table 1 reports the NFC's real corporate tax pay- Data on tax r«eipts from the nonfinancial corporate sector are based on authors' calculations, which are described in the Appendix. Re<:eipts are net of carryback refunds and audit-induced tax payments. ments, measured in 1986 dollars. These tax payments peaked at $92.5 billion in 1%8, and, with the exception of three years in the late 1970s, they have been substantially below this level ever since. Average tax payments by the NFCs were $78.6 billion in the 1960s, $76.4 billion in the 1970s, and $49.6 billion for the last five years. The data demonstrate the recent decline in corporate tax revenues, however, since average payments for 1976 to 1980 were 63 percent greater than average revenues in the last five years. This decline in corporate taxes is even more remarkable when viewed in the context of the growing economy. The second and third columns in Table 1 describe corporate taxes relative to GNP and corporate assets. Corporate taxes averaged 3.7 percent of GNP during the 1960s, compared with 1.3 percent during the first half of the 1980s. In 1982, when corporate taxes reached their postwar low, they accounted for only 0.9 percent of GNP. An equally pronounced decline emerges from column 3, which shows the ratio of tax payments by nonfinancial corporations to the net replacement value of their tangible assets. This asset measure is constructed by subtracting corporate debt outstanding from the replacement cost of corporate tangible assets and provides a natural scaling variable for corporate taxes, because it reflects changes in the size of the corporate sector. Tax payments by NFCs averaged 4. 6 percent of net assets during the first five years of the 1960s and were even higher at the end of the 1950s. The tax-to-asset ratio has fallen by a factor of 3 during the last twenty-five years. For the five years ended 1985, it averaged 1.5 percent, and it fell below 1 percent in 1982. Taxes as a percent of assets fell by 1.4 percent between 1961-1965 and from 1971-1975 and declined by as much again during the last ten years.
Corporate taxes have also become a substantially less important part of the federal budget. They accounted for 6.5 percent of revenues during the most recent five years. By comparison, corporate taxes were nearly three times as important, accounting for 18.7 percent of federal revenues, from 1961 to 1965. The rapid growth of federal revenues from other sources, particularly social insurance taxes, coupled with declining corporate taxes to explain the pronounced reduction in the corporate tax share during the last twenty-five years.
Declining Tax Rates Versus Declining Tax Base
The decline in corporate taxes can be divided into two components: a decline in the rate at which corporate profits are taxed, and a decline in corporate profits themselves. The first component is the average tax rate, which has attracted widespread attention in the tax policy debate of the last five years (see Joint Committee (1984) or Spooner (1986) , for example). Many analyses of the corporate tax focus exclusively on the average rate, however, and imply the misleading conclusion that its movements are the sole cause of recent reductions in corporate tax revenues. This section demonstrates that although average tax rates have dedined, changes in corporate profits, the base of the corporate income tax, are an equally important factor in explaining the change in corporate taxes.
EFFECTIVE TAX RATES AND THE TAX-TO-ASSET RATIO
The tax-to-asset ratio is the product of the average tax rate and the corporate profit rate:
Taxes/ Assets = (Taxes/Profits) (Profits/ Assets). (1) Profits denote the real economic profits earned by corporate equity holders, 1 Taxes/Profits is the average effective tax rate, and Profits/ Assets defines the real economic profit rate. Profits excludes foreign source income of U.S. corporations, since our asset measure includes only domestic capital. A detailed description of our measure of economic profits is provided in the Appendix. Table 2 presents data on the tax-to-asset ratio, the average tax rate, and the profit rate for each year since 1959, the year when some IRS data used in our calculations first became available. The data clearly indicate that both falling average tax rates and a decline in profitability have contributed to lower corporate taxes. The average effective tax rate was 41.8 percent during the 1%0s, compared with 30.8 percent during the last five years, a decline of more than one quarter. Average tax rates dedine!f throughout the 1970s, averaging 43.4 percent for 1971 to 1975 and 40.1 percent for 1976 to 1980 . The average effective tax rate for 1981-1985 was 9 percent lower than its value for 1976-1980. This decline is twice as large as the drop between the first and second halves of the 1970s.
The second column of Table 2 reports the economic profit rate on nonfinancial corporate capital. The profit rate trends down throughout our sample period but drops quite sharply in the 1980s. From an average of 1. Alternative views of wllat constitutes the corporate tax base are also possible. Summers (1979) and Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux, and Potecha (1983) consider the total earnings of the corporate sector, including those paid to debt holders, as the tax base. Because interest payments are taxed less heavily than equity earnings, measuring the average tax rate relative to this base would lower the average tax rate but not affect its decline over time. The profit rate associated with this concept of corporate profits has also dedined significantly during our sample period.
10.9 percent during the 1960s, the profit rate fell to 7.2 percent during the 1970s and 4. 9 percent during the last five years. In 1982, when corporate taxes reached their postwar low, the corporate profit rate was also at its lowest level (2.9 percent). Although profits accruing to equity holders have rebounded since then, averaging 6.3 percent in the last two years, they are still well below their level in the previous two decades. The three columns correspond to Taxe~/Prafits, Profits/ Assets, and Taxes/Assets as described in the text. The third column is the product of the fLrSt two. Data descriptions are provided in the Appendix.
This dramatic decline in corporate profits is an important source of lower corporate tax receipts. The last column of Table 2 shows that the tax~to~asset ratio at the beginning of the 1960s, for example, was 3.1 times that at the beginning of the 1980s. The average effective tax rate was 1.35 times its level in recent years, and the profit rate was 2.2 times its recent value. Declining profitability is therefore substantially more important than changes in the average tax rate in accounting for there~ duction in corporate taxes.
The relative importance of changes in tax rates and the tax base can be illustrated by calculating what corporate tax receipts in the early 1980s would have been if either the average tax rate or the profit rate had re~ mained at its earlier level while the other changed over time. Actual cor~ porate tax receipts averaged 49.6 billion 1986 dollars in [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] . Ii the profitability of corporate assets had been the same as in the 1960s, tax receipts would have more than doubled to $ll0.4 billion. Even setting the profit rate equal to its value for 1976-1980 would have increased annual revenues by over $20 billion, to $72.5 billion. Fixing the average effedive tax rate at its earlier level would also have raised taxes, though not by as much as the return to earlier profit levels. If the tax rate during the last five years had returned to its level in the early 1960s, taxes would have averaged $68.4 billion per year. Replacing the actual tax rate with its average value for the late 1970s would raise tax receipts by $13 billion to $62.5 billion per year.
INTERPRETING THE AVERAGE TAX RATE
Although our division of the tax~to~asset ratio into average tax rate and profit rate components may provide some insight into the source of de~ dining tax revenues, the two components are not independent. The na~ ture of the corporate income tax makes the average tax rate critically dependent upon the level of corporate profits. For taxable firms, many corporate tax deductions, such as depreciation allowances and tax cred~ its, may be claimed regardless of the level of profits. A 1 percent increase in profits therefore raises the firm's taxable corporate income by more than 1 percent, increasing the average tax rate.
An offsetting effect arises for nontaxable firms. For firms with negative taxable income and no capacity to carry losses back against prior taxes, current tax payments will be zero regardless of how negative their real economic income is. An increase in profitability will not affect their taxes. It will, however, increase their economic profits, which enter the de~ nominator of the average tax rate calculation for the entire corporate sec~ tor. These links between profitability and tax rates make it impossible to interpret changes in the average tax rate solely as the result of legislation.
A simple example can illustrate these points. Consider a firm that purchases a capital asset for $1,000 and is entitled to tax depredation allowances of $150 per year, whereas the asset's true economic depredation is $100 per year. If the firm uses no debt and has no other inputs to the production process, then its real economic profits are its receipts less $100. If the economic profit rate is 7 percent, receipts will equal $170 and the firm's taxable income will be $20. Assuming a flat-rate corporate income tax with a 0.50 marginal rate, the firm pays $10 in taxes for an average tax rate of 10/70 = 0.142, and a tax-to-asset ratio of 0.01. Now consider what happens if the economic profit rate rises to 10 percent, bringing receipts to $200. Taxable income rises to $50, so taxes are $25, the tax-to-asset ratio is 0.025, and the average tax rate is 0.25. Shocks to corporate profits therefore affect measured average tax rates, even when the tax system is held constant.
To illustrate how, if some firms have tax losses, increased profits can lower the average tax rate, we introduce a second firm. It owns assets identical to those of the first firm, which earns a 7 percent return, but it operates in a different market with a 3 percent profit rate. Its receipts are $130, taxable income equals -$20, and it pays no taxes. The aggregate tax rate, computed by adding together the taxes of both firms and dividing by the sum of their profits, is 19.2 percent (25/130). The aggregate profit rate is 6.5 percent (130/2000) . Now consider what happens if the second firm's profit rate rises to 5 percent. Its taxable income is now exactly zero, but it still pays no taxes, so the aggregate average tax rate is 16.7 percent (25/150), down from 19.2 percent. The aggregate profit rate rises to 7.5 percent, illustrating the possibility of a negative relationship between profitability and the aggregate average tax rate.
The sensitivity of average tax rates to economic conditions is only one of their many shortcomings as a measure of corporate tax burdens. It is well known (see Auerbach (1983) or Fullerton (1984) ) that average tax rates may provide little information on the pattern of marginal tax incentives facing new investments. In addition, aggregate average tax rates may conceal important differences in tax burdens across different assets and different firms. Average corporate tax rates also provide an incomplete account of the tax burden on corporate income by ignoring the taxes paid by shareholders.
There are also measurement problems associated with average tax rates. They fail to consider "implicit taxes," such as the reduced returns received by banks that invest in municipal debt, as part of the total tax burden. Likewise, many sources of true economic income are ignored, since certain accounting practices that misstate economic income are not corrected. This problem even applies to the National Income Accounts.
An example of such a misstatement is the inappropriate timing of expenses under the completed contract accounting method. Accounting differences accentuate the problem of comparing average tax rates across industries.
Why Have Average Tax Rates Declined?
The last section demonstrated that declining profits and declining average tax rates are jointly responsible for the dramatic fall in corporate taxes. Despite numerous shortcomings, average tax rates do prove useful in analyzing changes in corporate tax revenues. They have also played an important part in the recent corporate tax reform debate. This section therefore extends our previous analysis by investigating the proximate causes of declining average tax rates. The source of recent changes in corporate profitability constitutes an unresolved puzzle, which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
STATUTORY TAX RATES VERSUS AVERAGE TAX RATES
Movements in average tax rates may be traced to changes in capital recovery provisions, the increased prevalence of firms with tax losses, increased use of investment tax credits, and other factors. Each of these factors causes the average tax rate to differ from the statutory maximum rate, as shown in Table 3 . The first column in Table 3 shows the maximum statu tory tax rate for each year from 1959 to 1985. The entries in the six middle columns describe how various factors have caused the average tax rate to differ from the statutory rate. Negative entries indicate factors that caused the average tax rate to be less than the statutory rate, and positive entries correspond to factors that increased the tax burden above the statutory rate. The average tax rate, Taxes/Profits, is reported in the last column. It is the sum of the maximum statutory tax rate plus the six adjustment factors in the middle columns. A detailed description of our methodology for decomposing the average tax rate is provided in the Appendix.
The first source of differences between statutory and average tax rates is increasingly generous capital recovery, as shown in the second column of Table 3 . This term includes both the tax reduction from use of the investment tax credit, as well as that due to differences between tax depreciation and true economic depreciation. During the most recent five-2. Since we are concerned primarily with the impact of legislative changes on tax receipts, we focus on the role of tax reforms in altering the average tax rate, Although tax changes may also affect revenues by altering profits; this effect is likely to be small over the time horizons we consider. year period, capital recovery provisions accounted for a 22 percent differential between the statutory and the average tax rate. This is a substantial increase from the late 1970s, when these provisions explained a 9.5 percent difference between the two tax rates, or the 1960s, when these factors reduced the average tax rate by 8.9 percent. 3 Because generous capital recovery provisions have been one of the popular villains behind the recent decline in corporate taxes, we shall later provide a more detailed breakdown of these effects.
The third column in Table 3 reports the effect of inflation on average tax rates. This column combines two separate influences. First, inflation leads to spurious inventory profits that raise corporate tax payments and the average tax rate. (Inflation's positive impact through a related channel, the failure to index depreciation allowances for inflation, is subsumed in the capital recovery term above.) Inflation also exerts a countervailing effect on the average tax rate by reducing the real value of corporate debt, generating capital gains for equity holders. These gains are untaxed, so inflation raises economic income but does not affect taxes. The two effects roughly cancel, resulting in a small net effect of inflation on the average tax rate. Inflation raised the average tax rate by less than 1 percent during the 1970s, and it has reduced the average tax rate by 3.5 percent during the 1980s.
The fourth column in Table 3 indicates the impact of imperfect lossoffset provisions on the average tax rate. The principal effect of imperfect loss offset is to raise the average tax rate when firms experience losses, since firms with negative income cannot claim tax refunds. Tax receipts are therefore higher than they would be in a system with proportional taxation of economic income. This effect is somewhat attenuated by the availability of loss carrybacks and net operating loss carryforwards. Carrybacks allow some loss offset in the year when losses occur. Loss carryforwards, in contrast, reduce a firm's current tax liability as a result of previous losses.
Imperfect loss-offset provisions may raise or lower the average tax rate, depending on whether net operating loss deductions exceed the value of losses not carried back. The entries in column 4 of Table 3 show that throughout 1959 to 1985 imperfect loss offsets generated a substantial net increase in the average tax rate. For the most recent five years, the provisions regarding losses increilsed the average tax rate by 11.8 percent.
3. Our calculations may overstate the importance of capital recovery provisions in lowering the average tax rate, because we assume that all changes in the difference between tax: and economic depreciation were actuaily claimed by firms. For firms carrying losses forward, this will overstate the importance of depreciation provisions and Losses_ This is much larger than the impact of losses in any previous period. Imperfect loss offsets accounted for a 4.4 percent increase in the average tax rate in the 1970s and a 3.2 percent increase during the 1960s. This result deserves emphasis: the increased incidence of tax losses during the 1980s has increased, not reduced, the average corporate tax rate. The fifth column of Table 3 describes how foreign tax provisions affect the average tax rate. This term consists of two parts. The first measures the increase in taxes that would have resulted if foreign source income were taxable at the U.S. statutory rate, and the second reduces taxes by the amount of foreign tax credits claimed. If the statutory tax rates in all other countries equaled that in the United States and all firms could utilize foreign tax credits in full, then the net foreign tax effect in our table would equal zero. If foreign countries levied taxes at rates below the domestic rate, the foreign tax effect would be positive since the domestic taxes on foreign source income would exceed the foreign tax credit. In our data, the net effeet of foreign tax provisions is a small increase in the average tax rate. This effect averages 0.4 percent in the last five years.
The sixth and seventh columns of Table 3 indicate the influence of two other factors, tax progressivity and an "other" category, which includes posttabulation revisions and miscellaneous tax credits, on the average tax rate. Neither factor has a large effect. Tax progressivity, which accounts for the fact that some corporate income is taxed at rates below the statutory maximum, lowers the average tax rate by roughly 3.5 percent with little variation over time. The "other" category usually raises the average corporate tax rate, since the results of tax audits are included in this category and they outweigh the other tax credits.
Table 3 dearly suggests that the most important factor causing average tax rates to fall below the statutory rate is capital recovery. For the last five years, capital recovery provisions depressed the average tax rate by 14 percent more than they did during the 1960s and by 13 percent more than during the late 1970s. We now consider a more detailed breakdown of changes in capital recovery provisions.
CHANGES IN CAPITAL RECOVERY PROVISIONS
The capital recovery variable in Table 3 has two parts: one due to the capital consumption adjustment, and the other due to the investment tax credit. The capital consumption adjustment is the difference between tax depreciation and real economic depreciation. It has two components: accelerated depreciation and basis misstatement. Accelerated depreciation is the difference between tax depreciation and economic depreciation at historic cost. Tax depreciation is based on tax service lives and deprecia-tion schedules. It usually provides larger depredation allowances than would application of realistic economic lifetimes and decay patterns to the historic costs of corporate assets. Taxable income therefore understates economic income, reducing the average tax rate. The second term, basis misstatement, measures the difference between straight-line depreciation using economic asset lives but historic asset costs and that using the same decay profiles but revaluing assets each year to their current replacement cost. Failure to index the basis of depreciable assets raises taxable income above economic income and therefore increases the average tax rate.
The data in Table 4 show the relative importance of the three parts of the capital recovery aggregate. During the last five years, accelerated depreciation reduced the average tax rate by 35 percent, the investment tax credit (ITC) lowered it 13 percent, and inflationary misstatement of asset basis raised it by 26 percent. These large offsetting effects correspond to the net effect of -22 percent that is reported in the third column of Table  3 . All three factors have become larger in absolute value during our sample period. In the 1960s, for example, accelerated depreciation lowered the average rate by 11.9 percent, inflation effects raised it by 5.4 percent, and the lTC lowered it by another 2.3 percent.
These results naturally raise the question of whether movements in the capital recovery factor are primarily the result of legislative changes, or whether they have been caused by other forces, such as a shift in the composition of investment toward equipment rather than structures. Although separating average tax rate movements into components due to legislative and other changes is a treacherous exercise, some illustrative calculations are nonetheless possible. Ziemer (1985) estimates the change in federal corporate tax revenues due to the passage of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, and presents a separate calculation for the impact of accelerated depreciation and other provisions. Using his revenue estimates, we calculate that the average tax rate would have been about 7 percent higher during the last four years if the accelerated cost and recovery system (ACRS) had not been adopted. This corresponds to increased revenues of $20 billion per year, on average, since 1982. The effect would have been largest in 1985, the year with the largest stock of assets receiving generous ACRS depreciation.
Although ACRS has lowered corporate taxes in the past four years, focusing only on the immediate postenactment effects of tax legislation can be misleading. Passage of a bill such as ERTA depresses corporate taxes by more in the period immediately after enactment than it does in the steady state. Immediately after enactment, revenues are reduced both because new assets are given substantial depreciation benefits immediately after installation, and because some relatively old pre-reform assets are still eligible for depreciation benefits under the previous, less generous depreciation rules. In the steady state, only the generous depreciation for new assets reduces revenues. This partially explains why, even without the TRA, corporate tax revenues were expected to rise during the late 1980s. An opposite effect arises with the recent legislation, which lengthens asset lives. It will collect more revenue in the short run than in the steady state, because some aging pre-TRA assets are paying higher taxes than they would have if they had been depreciated under the new rules.!
Corporate Taxes under the 1986 Tax Refonn Act
The TRA shifts $120 billion of federal tax liability from households to corporations from 1987 to 1991. The TRA will therefore affect both the average tax rate and the tax-to-asset ratio for nonfinancial corporations. This section uses revenue projections from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (1986) to estimate the course of average tax rates over the next five years. It compares the tax trajectory without the TRA with the trajectory under the new legislation, and places the increased corporate tax burden in historical perspective. Table 5 compares the paths of corporate tax payments under old law and the TRA. A detailed description of the calculations is provided in the Appendix. The first panel shows the level of corporate tax payments by NFCs in 1986 dollars under the two regimes. Even under old law, corporate taxes are projected to rise. By 1990, for example, they will be 77 percent higher than in the first five years of the 1980s. Rising corporate tax payments can be traced to two sources. First, corporate profits are forecast to rise in the late 1980s. Our CBO-based projections imply a profit rate of 8. 2 percent during 1987-1991, compared with 4. 9 percent in the early 1980s. In addition, the front-loading of depreciation under ACRS implies that the average tax rate on projects undertaken since 1981 is low early in the project's life and high later on. As more projects reach the high-tax stage of their life cycle, corporate taxes also rise.
Under the TRA, revenues rise even more rapidly than under old law.
4. Although revenues will be lower immediately after a tax reform like ERTA than they will be in the steady state, it does not follow that tax revenues two years after the reform are higher than those in the year after the reform. There is a countervailing revenuereducing effect: as th.e stock of assets being depreciated under the generous new rules rises, tax receipts may decline.
By 1990, corporate taxes from the NFCs will exceed $100 billion (1986 dollars), more than double the level of the past five years. For 1987 to 1991, corporate taxes are 22 percent greater under the TRA than under current law. The new bill's revenue impact is largest in 1987, when it raises over 30 percent more revenue than the current law. The reason is that rates remain high, but most tax preferences have been eliminated. The two lower panels of Table 5 show corporate taxes relative to GNP and corporate assets. Under current law the tax-to-GNP ratio would rise from 1.2 percent in 1985 to 1.8 percent in 1991 while the TRA raises this ratio to 2.2 percent. The new law therefore returns the tax-to-GNP ratio to its level during the late 1970s but not to the level (3. 2 percent on average) of the 1960s. A similar statement applies to the ratio of tax payments to net NFC assets, which is plotted in Figure 1 . From an average of 1.5 percent during 1981 to 1985, this tax measure rises to 2.6 percent under old law and to 3.1 percent under new law by 1991. The new law will double the ratio of taxes to corporate assets, although this ratio will still be lower than it was during the 1960s. Although part of the change in tax revenues is due to anticipated increases in corporate profits, the average tax rate will also change significantly during the next five years. This change is shown in the first two rows of Table 6 , which report the average tax rates under old law and under the TRA for 1986 to 1991. Without any legislative change, the average tax rate would have increased from 0.24 in 1985 to 0.30 by 1990. This is higher than in the first five years of the 1980s but still below the level of the late 1970s. Under new law, by comparison, the average tax rate rises to 0.36 by the end of the decade, almost returning to its level of the late 1970s. The TRA has its largest impact on the tax rate in the transition period, 1987 and 1988, when the ratio of taxes to economic profits rises by 8.1 percent and 6.5 percent, respectively. teen major categories and hundreds of minor categories through which revenue changes occur. A detailed analysis of why the average tax rate will differ from the statutory rate is impossible because many of therequired data series are unavailable. We can, however, provide a rough sketch of why the average tax rate changes under the new law. The last four rows in Table 6 disaggregate changes in the effective tax rate between old law and the TRA into four categories. The first, the change in the statutory rate, reduces the average rate. There are no rate changes for 1986. In 1987, the statutory rate falls by 6 percent to the 40 percent "blended" rate for a company whose fiscal year coincides with the calendar year. Beginning in calendar 1988, the top statutory rate is 34 percent.
Several provisions offset the statutory rate reduction and raise the average tax rate. The next row shows the impact of changes in capital recovery provisions, principally the repeal of the lTC and the extension of tax depreciation lives. This accounts for an 11 percent increase in the average tax rate in 1991. In the earlier years, it is somewhat less important, principally because transition rules allow a substantial share of the investment undertaken prior to 1988 to obtain favorable tax treatment.
5
The penultimate row in Table 6 shows how changes in accounting rules affect the average tax rate. There are important provisions in this category, including changes affecting long-term contracts, the capitalization of construction and development costs, and the treatment of capital gains on installment obligations. These accounting changes raise the average tax rate by nearly 5 percent in 1988, and by an average of 3.8 percent during 1987 to 1991." The final row of Table 6 shows how various other factors cause the average tax rate under the new law to differ from 5. Our measure of the average tax rate change due to capital recovery may understate the actual impact of the new law because o£ the interaction between depreciation provisions and the strengthened minimum tax. For firms with substantial depreciation deductions, the new minimum tax may raise tax payments. This is classified as an effect of the minimum tax, not depreciation rules, in our analysis. 6. An important caveat applies to the accounting-induced change in average tax rates. Table  6 reports the accounting-induced change in taxes divided by our measure of economic income. Each accounting change, however, also affects the measured value of economic income. Repeal of the completed contract method of accounting, for example, will change th.e IRS measure of receipts less deductions that forms the basis for our profits variable. Average tax rates computed relative to measured economic income under the new tax regime, th.erefore, would be sligh.tly lower than those reported here, because income will be higher as a result of these accounting changes. Average tax rates in all previous years, computed relative to an economic income measure that did not allow for deferred accroal under the completed contract method, would be lower than those reported in Tables 2 and 3 . The change in average rates over time is not affected by the choice of convention for economic income, even though the level of th.e average rate is.
that under previous law. These provisions include the strengthened minimum tax, changes in foreign tax credit provisions, and revenues from increased tax compliance. These miscellaneous provisions increase the average tax rate by 4.4 percent in 1991. Although our calculations of the factors behind changes in average tax rates are necessarily uncertain, they do underscore tWo important features of the TRA. First, changes in capital recovery provisions will significantly raise corporate taxes. By the late 1980s, the differential betWeen the statutory and the average tax rate that will be attributable to capital recovery rules will return to its level in the 1960s and 1970s. The TRA therefore reverses the changes of the early 1980s, when the combination of accelerated depredation and investment credits lowered average tax rates by as much as 25 percent. Second, many of the important revenue-raising provisions in the new law are excluded from the usual economic analysis of corporate tax incentives. Marginal effective tax rate calculations, such as those in King and Fullerton (1984) , do not usually incorporate particular accounting rules, minimum taxes, or many of the other provisions that have an important effect on corporate investment incentives.
Conclusions
This paper explores why corporate tax revenues have declined for the last thirty years. Contrary to many claims, legislative changes explain less than half of the decline in revenues since the mid-1960s. The decline in corporate profits, which averaged nearly 11 percent of the value of net corporate assets during the 1960s, as compared with just under 5 percent in the 1980s, is a more important factor.
Declining corporate tax revenues have been accompanied by a decline in the average tax rate, the ratio of corporate taxes to economic profits. Although this average tax rate is of limited value for analyzing the incentive effects of the corporate tax, it has attracted widespread attention in the recent tax reform discussion. Changes in both the tax law and the rate of corporate profits affect the average tax rate. The change in depredation provisions betWeen the late 1970s and the early 1980s reduced the average tax rate by roughly 13 percent.
The TRA, which raises $120 billion in corporate taxes over the next five years, accelerates the trend toward rising average tax rates that would have occurred under old law. Reduced capital recovery allowances and other changes in the 1986 Act will combine to raise average effective tax rates to 36 percent by 1990, compared with 31 percent in the first five years of the 1980s. Corporate taxes as a share of GNP and relative to corporate assets will also rise significantly. By 1990, federal tax payments will equal3 percent of net corporate assets, well above their level in the early 1980s and approximately equal to their asset share in the late 1970s. Taxes will still remain a smaller fraction of assets than they were in the 1960s, however, in part because corporate profitability is projected to be well below its level two decades ago. Although we focus on the TRA's revenue impact over the next five years, this is a potentially misleading indicator of a tax bill's revenue effects. By lengthening the depreciation lives of many assets, the new law raises corporate tax revenues in the short run at the expense of some reduction in future years. The inherent uncertainty in long-range forecasts, however, makes it difficult to quantify these effects.
Much of our analysis implicitly divorces the average tax rate from the corporate profit rate, although such a separation is impossible. Because corporate taxes do not rise proportionally with corporate profits, changes in the profit rate have a direct influence on the average tax rate. Over longer horizons, the average tax rate may also affect the profit rate, at least if average and marginal tax rates move in tandem. Higher tax burdens will induce offsetting reductions in capital investment, which should increase pretax profitability.
Finally, our analysis of revenue changes in the TRA suggests that a wide range of corporate tax provisions that have important revenue effects are typically ignored in the economic analysis of the corporate income tax. These provisions affect the average and marginal tax rates on new investment and deserve to be incorporated in future work.
TECHNICAL APPENDIX DESCRIPTION OF THE AVERAGE TAX RATE DECOMPOSITION AND DATA SOURCES
This Appendix explains how we allocate changes in the average tax rate into various components, describes our measures of tax payments and economic income for nonfinancial corporations, and presents a detailed account of our post-1986 projections.
The Average Tax Rnte Decomposition Our average tax rate decomposition begins from the definition of federal tax receipts from the NFCs:
ISTT denotes income subject to tax, -r is the maximum statutory corporate tax rate, and..\ is a "progressivity parameter" reflecting the fact that not all taxable income is taxed at the top marginal rate. All the terms on the right side of (Al) are directly available, except for..\. We estimate A, using data from the Statistics of income sourcebook, as A = Taxbefcredh ISTT, where Taxbefcred is taxes payable before computation of credits. Investment tax credits (lTC), foreign tax credits (FTC), other credits (Othcred), and loss carrybacks (Cbacks) reduce corporate tax receipts. Retab, which corresponds to the results of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audits and other changes in previous returns, is typically positive and therefore raises revenue. Note that our measures of tax credits correspond to actual, not potential, credits; limits on the use of tax credits may induce substantial differences between the two in recent years (see Altshuler and Auerbach (1986) for a discussion).
Whereas taxes are levied on income subject to tax, average tax rates are calculated relative to the real economic income of shareholders, denoted by Profits. Income subject to tax and economic income are related by the identity
where NTI is the net income of firms with current losses and zero taxable income, NOL is the statutory deduction for net operating losses incurred in previous years, CCADJ is the National Income Accounts capital consumption adjustment (the difference between tax and economic depreciation), IVA is the inventory valuation adjustment (again from NIPA) that measures the spurious profits that result from inflation on goods in inventory, Debtgain is the transfer from bondholders to equity holders that takes place when inflation reduces the value of outstanding debt, and FSI is· the foreign source income of U.S. corporations. A very helpful reference for understanding the relationship between IRS and National Income Accounts measures of corporate profits is the U.S. Department of Commerce (1985) .
Equations (Al) and (A2) can be combined to obtain an expression for tax receipts in terms of economic income. Dividing through this expression by economic income yields The first term on the right side of (A4) is the maximum statutory tax rate. The six adjustments to the statutory rate required to obtain the average tax rate correspond to the entries in Table 3 .
The first adjustment involves capital recovery provisions. It is the sum of ITCs and CCADJ, the difference between tax depreciation and economic depreciation of corporate assets at replacement cost. The National Income Accounts also disaggregate the CCADJ into the components due to accelerated depreciation at historic cost and inflationary misstatement of basis; this breakdown is used in Table 4 .
The next adjustment term corresponds to the other distortions of profits related to inflation. It includes the inventory valuation adjustment and the inflation-induced gain on corporate debt. National Income and Product Accounts (NIP A) convention defines IVA as a negative quantity; the average tax rate is therefore increasing in the IVA, which in turn is an increasing function of inflation. Debtgain is positive, however, andreduces the average tax rate during periods of high inflation, because the inflation-induced gains of the equity holders are not part of the tax base, so they yield income but no tax liability. The net effect of these two factors depends upon the level of leverage and the stock of inventories held in the corporate sector.
The third adjustment term concerns corporate losses and consists of three parts. The first is the net income of firms with zero taxable income, the second adds net operating loss deductions back into taxable income, and the third adjusts for the use of current losses to obtain carryback refunds. Again there are countervailing effects. Higher levels of both NOL deductions and carryback refunds reduce the average corporate tax rate relative to what it would be in a system that taxed current economic income. Increases in the losses accruing to currently nontaxable firms, however, raise the average tax rate. (NTI is a negative number, so an "increase in losses" is a reduction of NTI, although an increase in its absolute value.) Losses raise the average tax rate because economic income is computed by netting the income of firms with positive profits against the income of firms with losses. For tax purposes, however, this offset does not take place. Firms with positive profits pay taxes, and those with negative earnings receive nothing. Imperfect loss-oft'set provisions therefore cause losses to raise the average tax rate.
The fourth adjustment to the statutory rate involves foreign income and tax credits. The adjustment term equals the tax liability that would have been due on foreign source income if it had been earned in the United States, minus foreign tax credits claimed. Since foreign tax credits are subject to a variety of limitations, the net effect of these two factors is usually to raise average tax rates. Our treatment of foreign source income also induces a potential relationship between foreign tax rates and the measured average tax rate on domestic income. For example, income earned in a country with a corporate tax rate below h will face additional tax when repatriated to a U.S. firm. This will raise our measured average tax rate on domestic income. Such effects are inevitable in any calculation such as ours that considers the domestic tax rate in one nation rather than the worldwide tax rate on worldwide income.
The two remaining adjustments are straightforward. The fifth, for the progressivity of the tax code, measures the change in the average tax rate due to taxing some positive-income firms at rates below the statutory maximum. It always reduces the average tax rate, since about 10 percent of the positive taxable income accruing to corporations is taxed at rates below the statutory maximum. The final term combines other tax credits with retabulations. Other tax credits are important primarily in recent years, when they include the R&D Tax Credit, the New Jobs Credit, and various energy-related credits. Retabulations consist primarily of audit profits and minor adjustments to tax returns filed in previous years. The NIP As present data on federal corporate profits tax liability for the entire corporate sector, but not for the NFCs. (NIPA also presents total tax liabilities to all governments, divided into financial and nonfinancial sectors.) We construct our own estimate of NFC federal taxes, following the NIPA approach for all corporations as in NIPA Our sample period begins in 1959 because that is when the IRS began publishing information on Income Subject to Tax, one of the variables used in constructing corporate profits. We construct a measure for the nonfinancial corporate sector as All Returns -Finance Insurance and Real Estate + Insurance Agents + Real Estate Operators. This is not exactly coincident with the NIPA definition, which also includes some holding companies that cannot be separately identified from the SOl data, but the differences between the two series are trivial. Carrybacks and other retabulations are drawn from unpublished data used to construct NIPA Table 8 .13. Our data on these series are for the entire corporate sector, because a breakdown for financial versus nonfinancial firms is not available. The errors associated with the inclusion of financial firms in these aggregates are also likely to be small.
Data Sources
For 1984 and 1985, our measures of tax credits are based on forecasts provided by the Joint Tax Committee. We extrapolated Income Taxes Before Credits by extrapolating total taxes, using NIPA data on NFC tax liability to all levels of government, and then adjusting it for the credit terms on the right side. We obtained data on the sum of carrybacks and retabulations from the preliminary NIPAs, and assumed carrybacks remained constant at their 1983level to divide the series into its two components.
We define real economic profits of the nonfinancial corporate sector as Profits = Income Subject to Tax (SOl) + Net Operating Loss Deductions (SOl) + Negative Taxable Income (SOI)
The data series for Income Subject to Tax and NOL deductions are drawn from Statistics of income. IVA is reported in the NIPA in Table 1 .16. The measurements of NTI, CCADJ, Debtgain, and FSI require discussion. NTI is the net income of firms with zero taxable income. It is computed as the difference between the entries for net income in the Sourcebook tables for (i) firms with and without net income, and (ii) firms with net income. NTI is this difference minus the net income differential for Subchapter S corporations and the special statutory deductions for firms with no taxable income. Although a measure of CCADJ is reported in the National Income Accounts, we amend it slightly for our analysis. We augment the NIPA measure of CCADJ (Table 8 .4) with the depletion adjustment for domestic minerals and the adjustment to depreciate expenditures for oil shafts, wells, and exploration from NIPA Table 8 .12. These are additional cases in which tax depreciation differs from economic depreciation, so these terms must be added to the accelerated depreciation component of CCADJ.
Debtgain is defined as the fourth-quarter-to-fourth-quarter percentage change in the GNP deflator times the market value of outstanding NFC debt at the end of the previous year. The time series for debt at market value is described in Feldstein and Jun (1986) .
FSI is measured as foreign service taxable income minus loss (before recapture), as reported in various issues of the Statistics of Income Bulletin. This corresponds to current taxable income from foreign sources.
Unfortunately, this data series is not available for every year since 1959; it is available for fourteen of the years between 1961 and 1982. We interpolated and extrapolated these data to other years when necessary. Our measure of economic profits differs from that in the National Income Accounts in several ways. The most important is its inclusion of the equity holders' capital gain on corporate debt during inflationary periods. In addition, the National Income Accounts include net foreign source equity income of all U.S. residents in the measured corporate profits. We also include the 15 percent of intercorporate dividends not exempt from taxation, because the data required to remove this component of IRS taxable income were not available before 1978.
All of the series based on NIPA data were available through 1985 except for the depletion and oil exploration adjustments, which were available through 1983. We constructed 1984 and 1985 values for these series as well as the NOLand NTI series from the IRS by assuming they remained constant at their real1983 levels. We assumed}.. remained constant at its 1983 value, and updated ISTT as ISTT = Taxbefcred/-r}.., using our Taxbefcred forecast.
Finally, we measured the current replacement cost of the net tangible assets held in the nonfinancial corporate sector, using the Federal Reserve Board's Balance sheets of the U.S. economy. The Balance sheets report year-end values, which we averaged to construct the midyear value for the denominator of our profit rate calculations. We subtract the Feldstein-Jun (1986) measure of the market value of corporate debt to obtain a series for the net assets of the corporate sector. Projections, 1986 Projections, -1991 Most of our calculations for 1986 to 1991 rely on data from the Congressional Budget Office (1986). We use their GNP projections and inflation forecasts for the GNP deflator throughout our calculation.
Revenue and Average Tax Rate
Our profit variable, Profits, has two components. One corresponds loosely to real economic profits in the NIPA; the other is Debtgain. To calculate the Profits components other than Debtgain, we use the CBO forecast of real corporate profits on an NIP A basis, ProfitsNIPA. We compute the ratio (Profits -Debtgain)/ProfitsNIPA for 1984 and 1985; the ratios are 0.747 and 0.703, respectively. Using an average ratio of 0.725, we forecast Profits -Debtgain based on the CBO forecasts and then add in Debtgain, calculated as the CBO inflation rate times our extrapolation of corporate debt (which is the 1985 value extrapolated at the nominal GNP growth rate).
We compute NFC tax liabilities under old law, using the CBO's forecasts of fiscal year corporate tax receipts (p. 63) minus projected receipts from Federal Reserve banks (taken from the OMB federal budget projections for fiscal year (FY) 1987 and years through 1989, with extrapolation through 1991, holding the series constant in real terms). This tax measure is a fiscal year indicator of accruals from the whole corporate sector. We use the ratio of NFC to total federal taxes in 1985 (0.885) to scale this profit measure for the NFCs, and then convert to calendar years by averaging adjacent fiscal years with weights of 0.75 and 0.25, respectively. When projections for FY 1992 were needed, we assumed that the fiscal 1991 value grew at the same rate as between FY 1990 and 1991.
Total federal revenues for fiscal years through 1991 are reported in the CBO (p. 63). We calculated calendar year revenues as a weighted average, and found the calendar 1991 value by increasing the calendar 1990 value in the same proportion as the fiscal 1991 revenue forecast relative to the fiscal 1990 forecast. We extrapolated the net replacement value of NFC assets, assuming they grew in real terms at 1.64 percent per year, the average growth rate for 1980 through 1985, and fully reflected inflation in the GNP deflator.
Finally, to measure the revenue changes associated with the 1986 TRA, we rely upon the Joint Tax Committee's ~evenue estimates presented in House of Representatives (1986 ) . We estimate the total tax effect for nonfinancial corporations as the total change in corporate revenues minus the changes due to taxation of insurance companies and financial institutions (titles IX and X of the revenue estimates) minus 0.115 times the revenue changes for the minimum tax, pension provisions, compliance, and miscellaneous other provisions (titles VII, XI, XV, and XVII). This correction adjusts for the share of these revenue changes that arise from the financial corporations. We adjust all revenue estimates from fiscal to calendar years using weighted averages, and construct fiscal 1992 estimates by assuming the fiscal 1991 value grows at the same rate as it did between fiscal 1990 and fiscal 1991. Our measure of capital recovery changes is just the revenue change due to title II, capital cost provisions, and that for accounting reforms is the revenue estimate in title VIII.
